Silicon Valley Bank was supervised by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. After it failed, a House oversight subcommittee heard from a Columbia law professor, a director at the Government Accountability Office, and a former Federal Reserve lawyer. The question was not whether the warning signs existed. It was why identifying them had not been enough.
Gambling with investors’ money
BalintIs it fair to say that they were gambling with their investors' money?
JudgeThat is accurate.
ClementsI think our findings were consistent with what she had mentioned. Again long-dated securities funded through uninsured deposits.
BalintMs. Judge, in your view, is it preferable to prevent this type of behavior, or it is better to clean it up after the fact?
JudgeMuch, much better to prevent it.
[Hearing transcript, questioning by Rep. Balint.]
What the supervisors missed
BalintMs. Judge, what actions should the San Francisco Fed have taken to address the many flags that arose at SVB in the lead-up to its collapse?
JudgeThe Fed did a decent job identifying some of the issues, but they failed to appreciate the magnitude of the issues. They were not creative in appreciating the fragility that existed.
BalintSo, the escalation framework or formula was not adequate?
JudgeI do not believe there was a structured escalation framework placed. There was a general idea that once there were a few problems that you would escalate, but they had not committed to an escalation framework. That really might have helped.
[Hearing transcript, questioning by Rep. Balint.]